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The New Haven School defi nes law as a process of decision that is both authoritative and 
controlling. It provides an intellectual apparatus to allow those who make use of it to clarify 
goals, to place past decisions in relation to the goals so clarifi ed and to appraise such decision 
trends for their compatibility with and approximation to the clarifi ed goals; it will enable 
observers to project future development in decision and to invent alternatives to approximate the 
preferred goals. 
This article demonstrates how the New Haven School’s methodology can be applied to the 
analysis of non-state actors in international law. The New Haven School dissects “decision” 
into seven discrete, but interrelated functions: intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, 
application, termination and appraisal. The New Haven School’s approach will identify which 
non-state actors are effective decision-makers in which particular decision function in the global 
decision process. The New Haven School is especially empowering individuals and non-state 
actors as they participate in the process of decision.
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論文（Article）
Preface
This article consists of two parts: Part One 
introduces basic features of the New Haven School 
of Jurisprudence which distinguish the New Haven 
School from all other major jurisprudential schools 
of thought and expla ins how the New Haven 
School’s intellectual apparatus is organized for 
decision-making; and Part Two shows how the 
intellectual framework of the New Haven School 
can be applied to the analysis of the growing role 
of non-state actors as decision-maker in the global 
process of authoritative decision.
Part One: The New Haven School of 
Jurisprudence
I. Introduction
The New Haven School of Jurisprudence was 
fi rst developed by Professors Myres S. McDougal 
and Harold D. Lasswell, and further refi ned by 
Professor W. Michael Reisman, all of Yale Law 
School.1 The locus classicus of the New Haven 
School is Lasswell and McDougal’s two-volume 
treatise, Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in 
Law, Science and Policy (1992).2 In their celebrated 
article in the Yale Law Journal, McDougal and 
3 Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, “Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest,” 52 Yale Law Journal 43, 
46 (1943).
4 Id. at 46-47.
5 Myres S. McDougal, “Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An Intervention,” 50YaleLaw Journal 828 (1947); Myres S. McDougal, “The Law School 
of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy Science in the World Community,” 56 Yale Law Journal 1345 (1947). 
6 Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, “Jurisprudence in Policy-Oriented Perspective,” 19 University of Florida Law Review 489 (1967). See also 
Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, “Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence,” 44 German Year Book of International Law 96 (2001). Cf. David Little, 
“Toward Clarifying the Grounds of Value-Clarifi cation: A Reaction to the Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence of Lasswell and McDougal,” 14 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 451 (1974).
7 Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, “Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Confi gurative Jurisprudence,”
8 Virginia Journal of International Law188, 196 (1968) [hereinafter “Theories About International Law”].
8 Richard A. Falk, “On Treaty Interpretation and the New Haven Approach,” 8 Virginia Journal International Law330 (1968).
9 Gidon Gottlieb, “The Conceptual World of the Yale School of International Law,”21 World Politics109 (1963).  
10 Josef L. Kunz, “The ‘Vienna School’ and International Law,” 11 New York University Law Quarterly Review 370 (1934), reprinted in Josef L. Kunz, 
The Changing Law of Nations: Essays on International Law 59 (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1968).  See also J.J. Lador-Lederer, 
“Some Observations on the ‘Vienna School’ in International Law,” 57 Netherlands International Law Review 126 (1970). “The jurisprudence of 
positivism provides the counter image to this empirical, dynamic conception of law. Its common focus on ‘existing’ rules, emanating solely from 
entities deemed equally ‘sovereign,’ does not properly refl ect the reality of how law is made, applied and changed. Positivism remains fi xated on 
the past, trying to reap from words laid down, irrespective of the context in which they were written, the solution to a problem that arises today or 
tomorrow in very different circumstances.” Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, “Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human Rights Abuses in 
Internal Confl ict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity,” 93 American Journal of International Law 316, 320 (1999). 
Lasswell called for “conscious, effi cient, and 
systematic training for policy-making” as a purpose 
of legal education “to serve the needs of a free and 
productive commonwealth”.3 And they said:
None who deal with law, however defi ned, can 
escape policy when policy is defi ned as the 
making of important decisions which affect the 
distribution of values. Even those who still insist 
that policy is no proper concern of a law school 
tacitly advocate a policy, unconsciously assuming 
that the ultimate function of law is to maintain 
existing social institutions in a sort of timeless 
status quo; what they ask is that their policy be 
smuggled in, without insight or responsibility. 
But neither a vague and amorphous emphasis on 
social “forces,” “mores,” and “purposes” nor a 
functionalism that dissolves legal absolutism for 
the benefi t of random and poorly defi ned ends 
nor a mystical invocation of the transcendental 
virtues of an unspecifi ed good life can effect 
the fundamental changes in the traditional 
law school that are now required to fi t lawyers 
for their contemporary responsibilities. Their 
direction is toward policy but their directives are 
at too high a level of abstraction to give helpful 
guidance. What is needed now is to implement 
ancient insights by reorienting every phase of 
law school curricula and skill training toward the 
achievement of clearly defi ned democratic values 
in all areas of social life where lawyers have or 
can assert responsibility.4 
Their theory about law is blended by the 
traditions of American legal realism and some 
of the best contemporary thought of the social 
sciences,5 and exhibits the common framework of 
inquiry, distinctively identifi able in its coherent and 
systematic approach to the study of law. They call 
this new theory “a policy-oriented jurisprudence”6 
since a jurisprudence that conceives law as a product 
of, and an instrument in, society must promote 
preferred ends of a society. It is sometimes called 
“a confi gurative jurisprudence,” which has at least 
three major characteristics: (a) it must be contextual, 
i.e., it must perceive all features of the social process 
of immediate concern in relation to the manifold of 
events comprising the relevant whole; (b) it must be 
problem-oriented; and (c) it must be multi-method.7
In early 1960s some observers started referring 
to this emerging group of scholars from New Haven 
and their characteristic conceptions of law as “The 
New Haven Approach”8 or “The Yale School of 
International Law,”9 in allusion to, and contrast 
with, Hans Kelsen’s Vienna School of positivism.10 
Professor Eugene V. Rostow observed way back in 
1973 as follows:
[T]he most remarkable feature of McDougal’s 
infl uence as a teacher is that so few of his 
pupi ls exper ience a need to demonst rate 
their independence by rebelling. . . . He has 
established not a sect, but a school. In almost 
every case, his students are indeed scholars, not 
acolytes. What they learn from McDougal and 
Lasswell is a systematic way to study Law, and to 
judge it, as an integral part of the social process, 
in its relationship to all the forces, social and 
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11 Eugene V. Rostow, “Book Review,” 82 Yale Law Journal, 829, 831(1973).
12 W. Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew Willard, “The New Haven School: A Brief Introduction,” 32 Yale Journal of International Law 576 
(2007); available at <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/959>.
 W. Michael Reisman, “The View from the New Haven School of International Law,” 86 American Society of International Law Proceedings 118 (1992); 
Eisuke Suzuki, “The New Haven School of International Law: An Invitation to a Policy Oriented Jurisprudence” 1 Yale Studies in World Public Order 
1(1974).
13 See Peter Boettke & Peter Leeson, “The Austrian School of Economics: 1950-2000,” in A Companion to the History of Economic Thought, 445, eds. 
Warren J. Samuels, Jeff E. Biddle, and John Davis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2003). Indeed, one of the leading members of the Vienna School once 
remarked, “A school has its greatest success when it ceases as such to exist because its leading ideals have become a part of the general dominant 
teaching. The Vienna school has to a great extent come to enjoy such a success.” Friedrich A. Hayek, “Economic Thought VI: The Austrian School 
of Economics,” 4 International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences 458, ed. David Sills (Macmillan & Free Press, 1968). “[McDougal’s] work has 
pervaded professional consciousness to the point where we may say, as Auden said in his eulogy of Freud, that ‘To us he is no more a person/Now but 
a whole climate of opinion/under whom we conduct our different lives.’” W. Michael Reisman, “Theory About Law: Jurisprudence for a Free Society,” 
108 Yale Law Journal 935, 939 (1999). 
14 Thomas Uebel, “The Vienna Circle,” The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/vienna-circle/>.
15 The Chicago School refers to the approach of the members of the Department of Economics at the University of Chicago. See <http://
homepage.newschool.edu/~het/schools/chicago.htm>. Cf. John Cassidy, Letter from Chicago, “After the Blowup,” The New Yorker, 11 Jan. 2010, at 28.
16 Harold D. Lasswell & Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry xxiv (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).
17 W. Michael Reisman, “Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law” in Democratic Governance and International Law 239, 
252, eds. Gregory H. Fox & Bad R. Roth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
18 “It is well known that the technique of analyzing defi nitions and criticizing propositional statements does not enable the ego to obtain access to
‘inconscious’. The conscious process itself may be under the domination or repetitive compulsions which are outside the awareness of the thinker.  If 
rationality includes the notion of freedom of choice and hence freedom from obsession and compulsivity, it is obvious that rational thinking requires 
the use of appropriate procedures by means of which the thinker obtains access to pertinent facts about the self.”  Harold D. Lasswell, “Clarifying Value 
Judgment: Principles of Content and Procedure,” 1 Inquiry 87, 92 (1958).
moral, which shape the law, and guide its course 
through time.11 
“A  s c h o o l  o f  t h o u g h t ”  e m e r g e s  b o t h  
self-consciously and by being characterized and 
identifi ed as such by others because of the common 
use by its proponents or supporters of basic tenets 
underlying an intellectual methodology. A group 
may develop into a school when its practice of the 
common mode of expression or its application of 
a common methodology fl ourishes at a given time 
and space. By 1974 a group of proponents of a 
policy-oriented jurisprudence came to be known as 
“the New Haven School.”12 The New Haven School 
has since then often considered comparable to such 
schools of thought as the Austrian or Vienna School 
of Economics,13 the Vienna Circle of Philosophy,14 
and the Chicago School of Economics.15 
II. Self-Scrutiny
The New Haven School is concerned with a 
process in which individual human beings try to 
infl uence the way social choices are made about the 
production and distribution of their preferred values, 
i.e., what they want, and with the ways in which 
those decisions should be made.
The New Haven School’s focus is on human 
beings: who makes decision and what consequences 
that decision will create on other human beings. 
Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan called this focus 
on human beings “hominocentric politics,” and 
defi ned it: “As science, it fi nds its subject matter 
in interpersonal relations, not abstract institutions 
or organizations; and it sees the person as a whole, 
in all his aspects, not as the embodiment of this or 
that limited set of needs or interests. As policy, it 
prizes not the glory of a depersonalized state or the 
effi ciency of a social mechanism, but human dignity 
and the realization of human capacities.”16  Thus, 
we deal with the sovereignty of the people and not, 
says Reisman, “a metaphysical abstraction called the 
State.”17 
At the fundamental level the New Haven School 
starts with the self-scrutiny of an observer or a 
decision-maker because it is human beings that 
make choices and those choices are infl uenced by 
their self-system. The New Haven School, at the 
outset, appreciates that an observer cannot be a 
wholly objective analyst of the community process 
he examines as he is both a product of, and a 
participant in, that very process.18 The New Haven 
School thus requires that you must, as a matter of 
thinking mode, disengage and separate yourself 
from the object of your observation. That can only be 
achieved by your careful self-scrutiny by checking (i) 
your emotional or neurotic tendencies; (ii) parochial 
tendencies that everybody accumulates, knowingly 
and unknowingly, over time as you grow up within 
your groups, be they ethnic, linguistic, geographical, 
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19 W. Michael Reisman & Aaron M. Schreiber, Jurisprudence: Understanding and Shaping Law 13 (New Haven: New Haven Press, 1987).
20 Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York: The Viking Press, 1962).
21 Rashomon, directed by Akira Kurosawa (1951), <http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/rashomon/>. 
22 Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 281ff (New York: Free Press, rev’d & enl’ed edn., 1957).
23 Herbert H. Hyman, Political Socialization:  A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior 51-66 (Glencoe, Illinois, 1959). 
24 “Facts do not organize themselves into concepts and theories just by being looked at; indeed, except, within the framework of concepts and theories, 
there are no scientifi c facts but only chaos.  There is an inescapable a priori element in all scientifi c work.  Questions must be asked before answers can 
be given.”  Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in Development of Economic Theory, Preface to the English editions, at ix-xvi (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1965). See also Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge 5 (New York: Harcourt, Brae 
& Co., Inc. 1936).
to the events he is observing and the goals he seeks.24 
T he  New Haven  Scho ol  e s t a b l i she s  a n  
observational standpoint by distinguishing theories 
about law and theories of law as a point of departure. 
The former is for scholars or disengaged observers 
to adopt an independent position free from offi cial 
predispositions in order to develop their capacity, 
both intel lectual and technical, required for 
development of policy in the promotion of common 
interest of a larger community. The latter is for 
offi cial decision-makers to organize their intellectual 
apparatus as a set of its policies, procedures, and 
guidelines for making decisions and for justifying 
their choices. It is designed to maintain power by 
ensuring the stability, consistency and continuity 
of organizational practice and authority. The New 
Haven School refers to this offi cial intellectual 
apparatus as “theories of law.”  The offi cials practice 
these theories of law for obtaining and justifying 
decision outcomes.     
The objectives of “theories about law” are (i) 
to better clarify policies in the making of a choice 
in life; (ii) to survey trends in decision so as to 
examine the extent to which preferred outcomes 
have been achieved in past policies; (iii) to analyze 
factors which accounted for success or failure of 
such policies; (iv) to project a future course of events 
if no intervention takes place; and (v) to invent and 
evaluate alternative approaches to the management 
of resources in order to fi ll the gap between policy 
objectives and projected future outcomes.  
Although both theories of and about law are 
complementary and interaffective to each other, the 
boundary of intellectual orientation is clearly drawn 
between them.
III. Focus of Inquiry
The New Haven School appl ies the most 
comprehensive analytical method of the social 
sciences to enabling an observer to extend his 
inquiry to all relevant variables to locate law in its 
larger context. It does not consider law as a body 
of rules; rather, it is interested in decisions and the 
religious; and (iii)professional bias that you develop 
through your intense and prolonged training.19 
As Lasswell demonstrated the nexus between 
persona l it y  cha racter is t ics  a nd pat ter ns  of  
decision-making,20 it is subjectivity that underpins 
decision-making. Akira Kurosawa’s classical movie 
“Rashomon” vividly demonstrates how radically 
different an observation can be from one person 
to another, depending on the individual person’s 
perspective in sifting which part of events can be 
more advantageous for recollection.21 
An environment in which an observer fi nds 
himself refl ects itself through his perspective 
and att itudes; his standards of behavior have 
been fash ioned by cont inu ing socia l izat ion 
within members of his groups and his reference 
to non-group members.22  A family is a primary 
group in a sense that how his family socialized the 
observer bears a signifi cant effect upon his attitudes 
and perspectives.23  The extent to which he is bound 
by religion, traditions, mores and customs of the 
immediate community in which he lives shapes his 
subjectivity.  Beyond such a primary environment, 
he has been exposed to a broader environment: the 
level of education he has acquired, the range of 
associations he has affi liated with, and so on.
The predispositional variables can be most 
conven ient ly descr ibed in ter ms of:  (i)  t he 
identifi cations an observer establishes in his relation 
to other individuals and groups; (ii) his demands for 
preferred interests, including those of pursuing an 
inquiry; and (iii) expectations about his own losses 
or gains. 
Social inquiry cannot proceed wholly free 
from bias—from the bias of those who conduct the 
inquiry and of those who appreciate its outcome. 
Objectivity cannot be achieved by simply collecting 
facts and presuming that they speak for themselves. 
Facts are not events; they are more often than not 
the conclusions an observer has drawn from his 
observation of those events.  How an observer 
collects the facts necessary for his inquiry and how 
he establishes the causal relationship among them 
cannot be answered without some preconceptions as 
44
Journal  of  Policy  Studies   No.42  (November  2012)
25 Lasswell & McDougal, I Jurisprudence for a Free Society, supra note 2, at 19-20. 
26 Id. at 26.
27 Myres S. McDougal, “The Impact of International Law Upon National Law: A Policy Oriented Perspective,” 4 South Dakota Law Review 265, 326 
(1959); reprinted in Myres S. McDougal & Associates, Studies in World Public Order 157 (New Haven: New Haven Press & Dordrecht,: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1987). On a matter of international concern, see Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, “Rhodesia and the United Nations: 
The Lawfulness of International Concern,” 62 American Journal of International Law 1 (1968). 
consequences of the making and applying of rules for 
human beings since rules are not given and they are 
continually being made and remade. The New Haven 
School defi nes law as a process of authoritative 
decision, combining requisite elements of authority 
and control. The New Haven School’s unparalleled 
contribution is the throwing out of the notion that 
law is no more than an autonomous body of rules; 
it has rigorously introduced policy consideration 
into studies in law. For us, it is not rules that make 
a decision, which is a culminating choice among 
policy options, but the individual person that decides 
or makes choices.
Most rules, proverbs, and principles exist in pairs 
of complementary opposites because we live in a 
plural society, in which many different individuals 
and groups make demands for values with varying 
expectations about the conditions under which these 
demands can be met. The legal principles of these 
plural societies are also expressed to accommodate 
competing interests of all different groups. Naturally, 
they invoke one set of pr inciples, which a re 
themselves complementary, to justify their demands.
What would guide one to choose one set 
of principles over the other set of principles in 
competing or confl icting value demands? In the 
words of Lasswell and McDougal:
Just as there can be no neutral or autonomous 
theories of law, in the sense of rules devoid 
of policy content, so also there can be no 
theories about law, in the sense of knowledge 
or ignorance, without policy consequences. 
In the context of these exigencies, it is the 
unique opportunity of observers specialized to 
inquiry about law not merely to relate law to 
its past policy content, but rather, and further, 
to clarify and promote change toward policies 
better designed to serve the particular kind 
of public order for which they are willing to 
commit themselves with their fellow community 
members. It is only by the deliberate clarifi cation 
of, and explicit commitment to, basic community 
goals—at all levels of abstraction and from both 
short-term and long-term time perspectives—
that dependable, creative, and economic guidance 
can be given to the examination of past trends, 
the allocation of efforts to the assessment of 
factors affecting decision, and the evaluation of 
future probabilities and alternatives.25 
Such policy orientation led to the formulation of 
the comprehensive, yet economical, intellectual 
apparatus by which to make a choice in a contextual, 
problem-solving and multi-method approach.    
The New Haven School considers power an 
indispensable component of law. When decision or 
choice is made in accordance with expectations about 
who is to make what decisions, by what criteria, and 
by what procedures, that choice must be realized in 
practice. Control is such requisite power as to make 
decision effective and enforced. Authority supports 
power and power in turn sustains authority. “When 
decisions are authoritative but not controlling, 
they are not law but pretense; when decisions are 
controlling but not authoritative, they are not law but 
naked power.”26 Hence, law is considered a process 
of decision that is both authoritative and controlling.
The New Haven School does not describe the 
world’s different community decision processes 
through a dichotomy of national and international 
law, in terms of the relative supremacy of one system 
of rules or other interrelations of rules. Rather, the 
New Haven School describes them in terms of the 
interpenetration of multiple processes of authoritative 
decision of varying territorial compass.27
The focus of inquiry must accordingly be 
directed to a social process in which people infl uence 
one another consciously or otherwise.  A clear focus 
is thus set on a process of interaction relating to 
particular problems in question.  The New Haven 
School speaks of “process” because there is an 
on-going interaction among people through time. 
The term “process” connotes that this interaction is 
one of the continual changes in interrelationships 
over a time period.  We speak of “social” because 
the fl esh-and-blood living beings are participants 
in that process of interaction, and we speak of 
“the world community” because the existence of 
the high frequency of interaction and the intensity 
of interdependence on a global scale causes the 
aggregate of people inhabiting this “shrunken 
globe” to realize their common stake.  The term 
“community” has very broad meanings and is often 
defi ned loosely in daily conversation.  When a group 
of people who share both common perspectives and 
45
E.Suzuki,   The New Haven School of Jurisprudence and Non-State Actors in International Law in Policy Perspective
 
28 There exist communities at various levels of intensity from a small hamlet through a city to a body politic and beyond.  The level of community can 
be defi ned according to the range of value effects resulting from a given social interaction.  See Talcott Parsons, The Social System 91 (New York: Free 
Press, 1951); Robert MacIver, Community: A Sociological Study 22-30 (Abingdon, Oxon: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd, 1936, 3rd edn).  See generally Carl J. 
Friedrich (ed.), Community: Nomos II (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959).
29 For the relevancy of the world community, see McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, “Theories About International Law,” supra note 7, at 189-195; C. 
Wilfred Jenks, Law in the World Community (London: Longmans, 1967).
30 Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, supra note 27, at 1.
31 Dean Acheson, The Washington Post, Dec. 11, 1966, at E6: 5-6.
32 McDougal & Reisman, supra note 27 at 12.
33 See generally Lasswell and Kaplan, supra note 16.
34 Harold D. Lasswell, On Political Sociology 116-117 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).
35 For elaboration, see Lasswell & McDougal, I Jurisprudence for as Free Society, supra note 2, at 335-373. 
36 See Lasswell & Kaplan, supra note 16, at 56-73.
following scheme:
Man (actor, participant) acts to optimize values 
(preferred events) through institutions affecting 
resources.33 
The term “values” is used here without any of the 
metaphysical or other connotations it may have in 
ordinary language. People in the world community 
both make demands and become subjected to 
counter-demands while trying to maximize all or 
certain values at their disposal in relation to other 
participants in the world social process. Eight 
value-institution categories are used to analyze this 
process. As Lasswell explains, “It is convenient to 
think in terms of a short list, and to use a list that 
roughly approximates the categories by which data 
are obtained and processed in the historical and 
social sciences.”34 These eight value institutions 
are: (1) Power: the giving and receiving of support 
in government, politics, and law; (2) Wealth : the 
production and distribution of goods and services, 
and consumption; (3) Enlightenment: the gathering, 
processing, and dissemination of information; (4) 
Skill: opportunity to acquire and exercise capability 
in vocation, professions, and other social activities; 
(5) Well-being: safety, health, and comfort; (6) 
Affection : intimacy, friendship, and loyalty; (7) 
Respect: recognition, whether personal or ascriptive; 
(8) Rectitude: participation in forming and applying 
norms of responsible conduct .35 These eight 
categories are not ranked in order of importance 
in any culture; we assume that the relative position 
of value varies with respect to subjectivities, time, 
and culture. These categories of preferred events 
enable the observer to describe social reality more 
specifi cally and systematically than does a simple 
descriptive fi at of the term “social reality.”36 When 
these value-institution categories or their equivalents 
are used to analyze any social process, they can be 
more specifi c in any degree desired.
a suffi ciently high frequency of interaction among 
them are territorially based, it is appropriate to 
call it “a community.”28 In any level of community 
from municipal through regional to global, people 
seek to broaden their identifi cations, expectations, 
and demands about values in both organized and 
unorganized ways transcending national territorial 
boundaries since they have become increasingly 
aware that the conditions under which these values 
can be secured are rapidly transcending the artifi cial 
man-made l ines inher ited from the arbit rary 
confi nes of feudalism.  Interdependence on a 
global scale demonstrates the presence of the world 
community.29 The explicit perception of the world 
community is found in all New Haven writings, of 
which the most celebrated article is Rhodesia and 
the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International 
Concern by McDougal and Reisman.30 Criticizing 
the contention that “whatever the Rhodesians have 
done has been wholly within their own country”31 
and, consequently, is insulated from international 
concern, and it affects nobody else, they argue that:
In the contemporary intensely interdependent 
world, peoples interact not merely through 
the modalities of collaborative or combative 
o p e r a t i o n s  b u t  a l s o  t h r o u g h  s h a r e d  
subje c t iv i t ie s - - no t  mere ly  t h roug h  t he  
physical movements of goods and services or 
exercises with armaments, but also through 
communications in which they simply take each 
other into account.  The peoples in one territorial 
community may realistically regard themselves 
as being affected by activit ies in another 
territorial community, though no goods or people 
cross any boundaries.  Much more important than 
the physical movements are the communications 
which peoples make each other.32 
To describe the world social process or any 
level of process, the New Haven School adopts the 
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37 Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, “The World Constitutive Process of Decision,” in 19 J. Legal Ed. 253, 403, at 262 
(1966) [hereinafter ‘The World Constitutive Process’]; reprinted in Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman (eds.), International Law Essays 191 
(Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1981).
38 Myres S. McDougal, “Human Rights and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure for Clarifying General Community Policies,” 
14 Virginia Journal of International Law 387 (1974). See “The Application of International Agreements: Introduction to the Reissue,” in Myres S. 
McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & James C. Miller, The Interpretation of International Agreements and World Public Order xxiii (New Haven: New 
Haven Press, 1994). 
39 W. Michael Reisman, “International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication,” 75 American Society of International Law Proceedings 101, 105 & 
107 (1981); available at <http://digitalcommons.law.yaleedu/fss_papers/713>.
40 Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, “The Prescribing Function in World Constitutive Process: How International Law is Made,” 6 Yale Studies 
in World Public Order 249, 250 (19809 [hereinafter “the Prescribing Function,” available at <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/2661>.
The descr ipt ion of events in a par t icula r 
community in reference to the most comprehensive 
community of mankind facilitates the clarifi cation 
of problems in question.  The interaction among 
participants in any social process culminates at a 
certain point in time and space in specifi c events 
where participants lose or gain what they perceive 
as preferred interests.  Such a culmination of events 
involving losses and gains is called “outcomes,” the 
sequence of which can be differentiated in terms of 
pre-outcome, outcome, and post-outcome phases. 
The New Haven School has developed a conceptual 
technique based on cultural anthropology to describe 
any social process most systematically in terms 
of those who participate in it  (Participants); the 
signifi cant perspectives of the participants, i.e., their 
identifi cation pattern, their value demands, and their 
expectations (Perspectives); the situations in which 
their interactions take place (Situation); the resources 
at their disposal on which they draw in order to 
achieve their demands (Bases of Power); the ways 
they manipulate and manage their bases of power to 
achieve their objectives (Strategies); the immediate 
results of the process of interaction (Outcomes); 
the long term effects of the  outcomes and process 
(Effects).
As mentioned earlier, law is defi ned, in most 
comprehensive terms, as authoritative decision. It 
is a response from authorities to claims lodged by 
claimants who are participants in the social process 
on authoritative decision-makers demanding that 
their controversies arising from the process of 
interaction be resolved. Claims consist of “facts” as 
seen by claimants, claimants’ demands, and policy 
that would justify their demands.
In these multiple processes of decision-making, 
people make a decision to maximize their preferred 
events through institutions affecting resources. The 
New Haven School has dissected what the term 
‘decision’ is made of in terms of its seven discrete, 
but interrelated decision functions as: (1) Intelligence: 
the gathering, processing, and disseminating of 
information relevant to the making of choices; 
(2) Promotion : the active advocacy of policy 
alternatives; (3) Prescription: the fashioning of one 
of competing policies as ‘law’ and projecting it as the 
authoritative policy of the community in question; (4) 
Invocation: the provisional characterization of events 
of deviation from prescriptions and the invocation 
of an authoritative response; (5) Application: the 
applying prescriptions to an alleged deviation, with 
sanction; (6) Termination: Putting an end to existing 
prescriptions and other arrangements that no longer 
refl ect appropriate public order goals; (7) Appraisal: 
the on-going evaluation of the general performance 
of the decision process.37 
As each of these functions may be performed by 
different groups in a variety of settings, it is critical 
to identify who is performing which function, where, 
for what purpose and how. The New Haven School’s 
principles of content and procedure (i.e., what to 
examine and how to think about problems) will 
ensure that our analysis of the problem at hand is 
attuned to the realization of policy goals.38 
In his seminal contribution to the development of 
the New Haven School, Michael Reisman developed 
a notion that international lawmaking is “a process 
of communication,” in which three coordinate 
communication components are simultaneously 
transmitted to the target audience, i.e., “the policy 
content, the author ity signal and the control 
intention.”39 Diagrammatically, this coordinate 
communication is expressed as follows:40 
 policy content 
Communicators   authority signal    Target Audience
 control intention 
The New Haven School’s communications model, in 
the words of Reisman,
liberates the inquirer from the limiting and, 
in the international context, the distorting 
model of positivism, which holds that law is 
made by the legislature. From the standpoint of 
communications theory, some law may indeed be 
made by specialized lawmaking institutions, but 
⎫⎬⎭
⎧⎨⎩
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44 W. Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew Willard, supra note 12, at 576; available at <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/959>.
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Part Two: Non-State Actors in International 
Law in Policy Perspective
I. Introduction
The notion of non-state actors itself derives from 
a dichotomy of the states as subjects of international 
law and other non-state entities as objects. Rosalyn 
Higgins’s comment is real today: “the whole 
notion of ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ has no credible 
reality, and, in my view, no functional purpose. 
We have erected an intellectual prison of our own 
choosing and then declared it to be an unalterable 
constraint.”45 The centrality of the only “states as 
subjects” approach hinges on the creation of “the 
entrance requirements,” a technique employed by 
territorial elites to safeguard their vested interest 
by setting up a rigid requirement for participation 
by non-state entities in the organized arenas of 
formal law-making.46 In such organized arenas these 
states represented by their respective governments 
are gatekeepers. To illustrate, the Preamble of the 
Charter of the United Nations proclaims at the outset 
that it is “We the people” that set out our purposes 
and designed how to achieve them, but in the end it 
concludes that it is “our respective Governments” 
that agreed to establish the United Nations.
Internat ional organizat ions, though often 
referred to as non-state actors, are part of the 
gatekeepers, which are essentially the extension 
of the state apparatus, distinguished from the rest 
of the participants in the global decision process 
which is civil society in Antonio Gramsci’s sense, 
i.e., non-state and private entities.47 In zeroing 
in the organized arenas of formal law-making, 
conventional analysis in terms of government organs 
tends to overlook numerous private initiatives 
involved in the anterior processes that precede such 
formal law making in organized arenas.48 This is 
unfortunate because, as Michael Reisman states, “[a] 
moment’s refl ection should dispel the notion that 
legislation originates, transpires and concludes in the 
legislature.”49 There is more than meets the eyes. 
any communication between elites and politically 
relevant groups which shapes wide expectations 
about appropriate future behavior must be 
considered as functional lawmaking.41 
To facilitate actual decision-making, the New 
Haven School specifi es a set of intellectual tasks 
that is necessary for decision-making as “it is the 
range of tasks performed, as well as the quality of 
performance which determines the relevance of 
inquiry for policy.”42 Such specifi c intellectual tasks 
must include the following:
1. Clarifi cation of the goals of decision;
2. Description of the trends toward or away from 
the realization of these goals;
3. Analysis of the conditioning factors that have 
accounted for past decision;
4. Projection of probable future developments, 
assuming no outside intervention; and
5. Invention of par t icular a lternatives and 
strategies to the realization of the preferred 
goals.43 
The New Haven School explicitly postulates a 
public order of human dignity as basic public order 
goals; it approximates the optimum shaping and 
sharing by all human-beings of all values: power, 
wealth, enlightenment, skill, well-being, affection, 
respect, and rectitude.
The intellectual apparatus that the New Haven 
School provides and the intellectual tools it equips 
you with will enable you to locate yourself in all 
contexts to understand where you can be most 
effective in the global process of decision. And so, 
it is no surprise that “the New Haven School can be 
especially empowering for individuals not associated 
with the state, a class that classical international law 
all but disenfranchised.”44 
Now, let us see, as a case study, how New Haven’s 
intellectual apparatus can be applied to the analysis 
of the role of non-state actors in international law.
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A l ist of Major Groups and Stakeholders 
recognized by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) is i l lust rat ive; it at tests 
how wide the range of participants in the UNEP 
decision-making process really is. The concept of the 
nine “Major Groups” established by Agenda 21 at the 
‘Earth Summit’ in 199250 recognizes the following: 
farmers, women, the scientifi c and technological 
community,  ch i ld ren and youth, ind igenous 
peoples and their communities, workers and trade 
unions, business and industry, non-governmental 
organizations, and local authorities. A group of 
non-governmental organizations is just one of the 
nine major groups. The UNEP uses the term ‘civil 
society’ as an umbrella term covering all nine 
Major Groups, whose representatives infl uence 
and col laborate with UNEP and pa r t icipate 
in the Governing Council /Global Minister ial 
Environmental Forum and its related meetings.51 
There are other private entities not included 
in the defi nition of UNEP’s Major Groups such as 
political parties, gangs, and private armies which 
also participate in the global decision process. For 
the purpose of this article, I treat international 
organizations not as “non-state actors,” but primarily 
as decision-making arenas.52 Although formal and 
fi nal decisions are made in the name of international 
organizations, “the actors that participated in shaping 
the content of the decisions of these organizations 
disappear in the shadow of the organizations.”53 
Territorial elites representing the membership of 
these international organizations are formal and 
offi cial decision-makers whom various non-offi cial 
and private entities infl uence and collaborate with 
in the decision-making process provided by these 
international organizations.   
II. Non-State Actors in Context:
Multiple Affi liations and Complex Layers of 
Decision Processes
As “[n]o dependable relationship exists between 
a structure that is called ‘governmental’ in a 
particular body politic and the facts of authority and 
control,”54 so “we, the people” of different territorial 
communities are participating in any international 
decision process through numerous entities operating 
in both public and private spheres of different 
levels of community before that decision process 
culminates in the making of the fi nal authoritative 
decision by “our respect ive Gover nments”.  
Functionally, therefore, states represented by their 
respective territorial elites are not the sole category 
of participants in the global decision process even 
though they will continue to be primary participants 
in that process.55 
When we focus on individual human beings 
who constitute groups and communities, it becomes 
evident that individual human beings have their 
own demands, identifi cations and expectations. 
They act on their own behalf or act collectively 
to maximize values through institutions affecting 
resources.  Groups and different levels of community 
they choose to join will accordingly be multiple and 
complex; their affi liation and consociation become 
transnational, interpenetrating territorial boundaries 
and cultu res.  In th is  globa l  socia l  process,  
participating individuals and groups in pursuit 
of their demands compete, coalesce, collaborate, 
co-operate each other, taking account of the activities 
and demands of other participants. Such interaction 
among participating individuals and groups generate 
competing claims on the authoritative decision 
process for response. It is, therefore, ineluctable to 
see a much wider range of actors other than states 
which participate in the global decision process.56 
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expectations and demands (perspectives), where they 
are interacting (situations), what resources are at 
their disposal (bases of power), how those resources 
are used (strategies), and with what culminating 
events (outcomes) or what longer-term consequences 
(effects).61 
We often use the term “actors” and “participants” 
interchangeably, as indicated in the fundamental 
schema for character izing the social process: 
“Man (actors, participants) acts to optimize values 
(preferred events) through institutions affecting 
resources.”62 What is important is “a comprehensive 
delineation which permits the observer, with 
minimal preconception, to identify those who are 
in fact actors in each context.”63 And the following 
explanation is given:
The fi rst step is to provide the observer with a 
‘checklist’ that covers the various conceivable 
‘form’ of interaction in the world community. 
Otherwise, signifi cant modes of participation 
may be overlooked. The great variety of practices 
that comprise the planetary social process, 
therefore, encourages the responsible observer 
to use a more general delineation or taxonomy 
in the initial phase of any survey. Once a 
provisional list of participants is developed, those 
who are critical actors can be identifi ed, again 
on a tentative basis, by their apparent impact on 
the pattern of value shaping and sharing in the 
situation under scrutiny.64 
“ [I]n this model,” says Higgins, “there are 
no ‘subjects’ and ‘objects,’ but only participants. 
Individuals are participants, along with international 
organizations . . . , multinational corporations, and 
indeed private and non-governmental groups.”65 
A. Non-State Actors and Specialized Agencies of 
the United Nations
It cannot be denied that the combined effect 
To use the New Haven School’s terminology, 
by a participant in the global decision process, “we 
mean an individual or an entity which has at least 
minimum access to the process of authority in the 
sense that it can make claims or be subjected to 
claims.”57 These participants include, apart from 
states and international organizations, the elites 
of transnational non-governmental organizations 
operating in the wide range of value sectors from 
those concerned with economic development, 
health, food, and population to those concerned 
with religious practices and teaching, fraternity, 
family, and skills and knowledge development, 
multinational business corporations, transnational 
professional associations, gangs, terrorist groups, and 
individuals.58 As Mahnoush H. Arsanjani observes, 
The expansion of the range of relevant actors 
to include non - state ent it ies has fu r ther 
complicated the dynamics of decision making 
at the international level. Non-state entities 
have become more infl uentia l in decision 
making at international fora through the adroit 
use of var ious st rategies. Likewise, rapid 
communications systems which are not always 
subject to the control of the state apparatus have 
required quicker reactions to international events 
than the organized deliberative multilateral 
system can supply.59 
Students of the New Haven School are not 
so much concerned with making any material 
distinction between the term ‘participants’ and the 
term ‘actors’ as making sure that the accurate and 
comprehensive framework of inquiry is employed to 
map social and decision contexts.60 What the New 
Haven School offers is a conceptual tool accurately 
to describe and assess any social process. We focus 
on individuals and groups in the fi rst category 
of a phase analysis by asking who are relevant 
actors in the situation (participants), followed by 
what are their subjectivities, their identifi cations, 
50
Journal  of  Policy  Studies   No.42  (November  2012)
66 Charter of the United Nations, art. 57, available at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter10.shtml> .
67 Id. at art. 71.
68 Id. at art. 57(1).
69 Id. at art. 59.
70 Id. at art. 55.
71 Id. at art. 70.
72 Report of the Secretary-General, Arrangements and practices for the interaction of non-governmental organizations in all activities of the United 
Nations system, UN Doc. A/53/170 (10 July 1998), available at <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/53/plenary/a53-170.htm>.
73 Math Noortmann, “Who Really Needs Article 71? A Critical Approach to the Relationship between NGOs and the UN,” in Wybo P. Heere (ed.), From 
Government to Governance: The Growing Impact of Non-State Actors on the International and European Legal System 113 (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2004).
74 ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 of 25 July 1996, available at <http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1996/eres1996-31.htm>. See also “Introduction 
to ECOSOC Consultative Status,” available at <http://esango.un.org/paperless/Web?page=static&content=intro>.
75 Ngaire Woods, “Multilateralism and building stronger international institutions,” in Alnoor Ebrahim & Edward Weisband (eds.), Global 
Accountabilities: Participation, Pluralism, and Public Ethics 38 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
76 ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 of 25 July 1996, supra note 74, at Part II: Principles to be Applied in the Establishment of Consultative Relations, para. 
15.
of the provisions of Ar ticle 57 of the United 
Nations Charter regarding the various specialized 
agencies brought into relationship with the United 
Nations66 and the provisions of Article 71 regarding 
the Economic and Social Council’s (ECOSOC) 
consultation with non-governmental organizations67  
has contributed to the spawning of non-governmental 
organizations around the world. 
T hese  spec ia l i zed  agenc ies  have  “wide  
international responsibilities in economic, social, 
cultural, educational, health, and related fi elds,”68 and 
for that reason, they were brought into relationship 
with the United Nations to undertake international 
econom ic and socia l  co - operat ion “ for  t he 
accomplishment of the purposes set forth in Article 
55.”69 It provides:
With a view to the creation of conditions of 
stability and well-being which are necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples, the United 
Nations shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, 
and conditions of economic and social 
progress and development; 
b. solut ions of internat ional economic, 
social, health, and related problems; and 
international cultural and educational 
cooperation;and 
c. universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion.70 
A corollary of the purposes set forth in Article 
55 is the promotion and development of various 
non-governmental organizations, the tasks of each of 
which are similarly delineated in the corresponding 
areas of responsibilities of the specialized agencies. 
As evidenced in the provisions of Articles 
70 and 71, ECOSOC’s competence to a l low 
“representatives of the specialized agencies to 
participate, without vote, in its deliberations”71 
and ECOSOC’s competence for “consultation” 
with NGOs are almost comparable in its essential 
function. It allows non-state actors, i.e., those entities 
external to the membership of the United Nations, 
to participate in ECOSOC’s decision process. Yet, 
the form and substance of NGOs’ relationship with 
either ECOSOC or any of the specialized agencies 
are vastly diverse and varied from one NGO to 
another, refl ecting the different “size, resources, 
impact, methodology, objectives and approach to 
international organizations.”72 By the same token, 
ECOSOC and the specialized agencies have their 
own diverse and idiosyncratic ways of dealing with 
NGOs.73
It is the consultative status accorded by ECOSOC 
that determines which NGOs will be given access 
to the organized decision arena of ECOSOC.74 It is 
essential to bear in mind that ECOSOC is itself an 
organized decision arena of the most comprehensive 
universal international organization, and at the 
same time ECOSOC is the sole “gatekeeper” who 
actually shapes “global civil society.”75 It declares, 
“The granting, suspension and withdrawal of 
consultative status, as well as the interpretation of 
norms and decisions relating to this matter, are the 
prerogative of Member States exercised through the 
Economic and Social Council and its Committee on 
Non-Governmental Organizations.”76 Those NGOs 
accredited by ECOSOC with consultative status 
must operate in accordance with the UN Charter and 
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non-state actors within the state when they acquire 
coercive means. It is not diffi cult to understand, 
therefore, that other consociations are more likely to 
be in a position to complement, compete with, and 
supplant, the authority and control of the state in any 
other value processes of a community. Let me indicate 
salient features of non-state actors’ activities in the 
major value processes. 
Power: Since most non-state entities are seeking 
to achieve a particular political end, they are seeking 
some form of power and exercising that power to 
varying degrees by infl uencing decision without 
assuming formal political power. Non-state entities 
seeking formal power as a scope value within the 
body politic in which they operate, are usually 
political parties. Should participation in civic arenas 
be denied, internal political arenas would become 
irregular, and when such non-state actors acquire 
signifi cant political strength, they would become 
liable for suppression by the incumbent territorial 
elites of the body politic. These aspirants would be 
more likely to resort to higher levels of coercion 
with a view to organizing a proto-state. The latest 
non-state actor which organized a proto-state was 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, 
which had negotiated with the government of the 
Republic of Sudan for a referendum on whether 
Southern Sudan should be independent by seceding 
from Sudan proper.82 Unlike any other non-state 
actors, those counter- territorial elites who are 
aspirants are more often than not “outlawed” by the 
incumbent territorial elites because they are not only 
competing with the extant territorial elites in power, 
but also seeking to replace them--sometimes extra-
constitutionally.83 As H.L. Nieburg aptly summarizes: 
“Every group that acts as a proto-state does not 
seek to become a revolutionary regime. Yet, in some 
cases, the process at work produces that result. 
Violence is the essential cutting edge that creates and 
maintains ecological separation between integrated 
social organizations.”84 
ECOSOC resolution 1996/31.77 
B. Non-State Actors and Civil Society
The non-state actors within the purview of 
ECOSOC are not concerned, in principle, with the 
power process per se of any body politic. But there 
are many private consociations competing with the 
state. As Max Weber observed that:
The law of the state often tries to obstruct the 
coercive means of other consociations. . . .
But the state is not always successful. There are 
groups stronger than the state in this respect. . . . 
This confl ict between the means of coercion of 
the various corporate groups is as old as the law 
itself. In the past it has not always ended with the 
triumph of the coercive means of the political 
body, and even today this has not always been the 
outcome.78 
Where non-state actors such as opposition 
political parties or armed private groups were 
involved in seeking to supplant the authority and 
control of the state, the hitherto monopolized domain 
of coercive means of the state is breached, and 
they will start competing with the extant territorial 
elites for power. Michael Reisman and I called these 
private groups “aspirants,” who are “groups which 
seek to participate in authoritative processes of a 
community with the aim of achieving infl uence or 
lawful control.”79 They are non-state actors like 
political parties, pressure/interest groups or citizens’ 
action groups or even private armies like the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement/Army.80 The point 
of emphasis is that the monopolization of coercive 
means by the territorial elites to the exclusion of any 
other entities in a given body politic is the hallmark 
of the state.81 Nonetheless, even that power of 
monopoly of the state becomes liable for erosion by 
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The decolonization process allowed newly 
emerging interna l el ites to set up “nat iona l 
liberation movements.” Many obtained observer 
status in the U.N. and its related agencies and/or 
regional organizations like the then-Organization 
of African Unity. For those aspirants such as the 
FLN in Algeria, the SWAPO in Namibia, the 
various contenders in Angola, the Polisario Front in 
Western Sahara, and the PLO, access to organized 
international arenas was an important issue, as 
was the recognition of representatives prior to their 
gaining control over territory.85 Non-states seeking 
some form of “recognition” are, in turn, subjected 
to claims by others for conformity to cr itical 
international standards of conduct.86 
G loba l i z a t ion  a nd  t h e  d eve lo pm e n t  o f  
communication and information technology have 
made recognition of aspirants real. Ahead of 
any other states, France recognized Libya’s rebel 
leadership, the Libyan National Council, as the 
sole legitimate representative of the Libyan people 
in March 201187 even though the Libyan National 
Council had not secured the level of confl ict and 
territorial control in a portion of Libya for according 
the status of insurgents or belligerents.88 The United 
States granted Libyan rebel leaders full diplomatic 
recognition as the governing authority of Libya on 
July 15, 2011. In the words of Secretary of State 
Hillary Rodham Clinton, the rebels’ Transitional 
National Council “has offered important assurances 
today, including the promise to pursue a process 
of democrat ic reform that  is  inclusive both 
geographically and politically.”89 
Wealth: There are three categories of non-state 
actors operating in the global wealth process: (i) 
transnational business entities whose primary 
purposes are profi t-making, capital accumulation, 
capital investment, and expansion of business; 
(ii) labor unions in the sharing of wealth; and 
(iii) not-for-profi t organizations whose primary 
purposes are to ensure the policies and practices 
of business entities in the fi rst category are fair, 
socially responsible, and environmentally sound and 
sustainable in the long run. 
In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
neo-liberalism ruled the world economy. As the 
state’s responsibility for provision of primary social 
services was being relegated to private entities, 
even NGOs, not normally considered for-profi t 
entities, have grown “to a $1 trillion industry, riding 
the global wave of privatization of services”.90 
Globalization has reinforced the effective reach 
of transnational business entities in setting global 
standards and forms of best practices in their 
respective areas of business activities such as 
fi nancial transactions (foreign direct investment, 
bonds, and insurance), transportation, construction, 
and so on. In the beginning these standards were 
originally introduced by major actors in a particular 
industry in their business agreements, which have 
subsequently become common usage and practice 
among many other entities in the same industry. Such 
development can be considered akin to “adhesion 
contracts” that cannot be negotiated. “In the eyes of 
the community,” explained Lasswell and McDougal, 
“the power exercised by unoffi cial organizations may 
be both controlling and authoritative.”91 
Just like the tripartite representation of states, 
workers, and employers of the International Labour 
Organization, workers and trade unions as well as 
business and industry associations play major roles 
in shaping policy for workers’ wages, industry’s 
investment, and so on.     
Enlightenment: International professional 
associations obtain and disseminate information 
and increase the general level of understanding of 
particular subject-matters in which their respective 
associations have expertise. The role of the Institut 
de Droit International and the International Law 
Association to the development of international 
law is undeniable. Mass communication media and 
international news agencies such as Al Jazeera, 
AFP, AP, BBC, CNN, NHK, Reuters, and so on are 
principal channels through which public perceptions 
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expand their operational scope across boundaries 
and cultures, respect deprivations are committed by 
them as well. Although in conjunction with activities 
of the United Nations, the role played by private 
individuals and groups in the creation of the United 
Nations Global Compact is noteworthy.94 
All pr ivate groups in the value processes 
enumerated above complement and, sometimes 
compete with, programs of offi cial agencies while 
seeking to increase their infl uence and effectiveness 
“by fi nding niches in critical decision functions 
which would allow them to shape prescriptions 
incorporating their preferred policies.”95 
III. Policy for Non-State Actors’ Participation in 
Decision-Making
It is individual human beings acting collectively 
as the ultimate actors in all groups, (whether they are 
territorial, functional, organized or unorganized,) 
which comprise participants, including non-state 
actors. As McDougal, Lasswell, and Lung-chu Chen 
explained:
Ours is a world of pluralism and diversity, a 
global arena in which various participants—
groups (territorial and functional, governmental 
and nongovernmental) and individual human 
beings—constantly interact under ever-changing 
conditions. All of the above-mentioned group 
participants—nation-states, groups, and private 
associations—are forms of associations through 
which individuals cooperate to achieve fulfi lment 
of their demands.96 
The fundamental premise for such diversity is 
“the reciprocal honoring of freedom of choice about 
participation in value processes.”97 The perspectives 
and operations of the individual human being are 
the basic empirical foundation of pluralism and 
diversity. And the basis of authority of government 
is the will of the people as expressed in Article 21(3) 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, now 
are shaped about what is happening around the 
world. 
Skill: Increasingly, groups trained in information 
technology are developing an interactive democracy 
in which people receive news and respond to it by 
expressing their views, which in aggregate quickly 
become public opinion. Recent political changes for 
democracy which started off in Tunis fi rst in January 
2011 spread quickly to Cairo, Tripoli, and Bahrain 
in less than a month, all thanks to the Internet and 
training provided by a unique transnational skill 
group called “the Centre for Applied Non-violent 
Action and Strategies” based in Belgrade, Serbia.92 
Affection: Historically, individuals associated 
themselves in pursuit of their demands on the basis of 
group identifi cation, be it cultural, ethnic, linguistic or 
religious. Minority groups within a body politic often 
sought to establish an equal political basis with the 
dominant group of the territorial community. These 
groups often extend across territorial boundaries 
into neighboring states, affecting that state’s policy. 
What is commonly referred to as “war lords” in 
Afghanistan, Congo, Somalia, or any other similarly 
confl ict-torn states, are local political families which 
enjoy a broad ethnic group’s support.
Rectitude: Of all rectitude groups, none is more 
infl uential in its reach than the Roman Catholic 
Church.  Its power refl ects the cohesiveness of its 
tenet, the strength of organizational hierarchy, and, 
above all, an enormous number of its followers around 
the world. The international legal status of Vatican as 
Holy See attests to the unique position enjoyed by the 
Catholic Church. 
Well -being: Private well-being groups such 
as Médecine Sans Frontières have increasingly 
active in alleviating the suffering of people in 
natural calamities such as earthquakes, tsunamis, 
typhoons and other natural disaster situations. The 
International Committee of Red Cross plays a special 
role in humanitarian assistance.93 
Respect: Many private associations have been 
major non-state actors in the protection of human 
rights. As transnational business corporations 
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considered customary international law and jus 
cogens.98 
We no longer consider sovereignty in terms of 
“a metaphysical abstraction called the State,” but 
in terms of “the sovereignty of individuals.”99 We 
must accept that the basis of authority expressed in 
Article 21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights perforce extends to claims for participation 
in the global decision process.100 Authority for such 
participation is summed up by Article 20 of the same 
Declaration which provides: “Everyone has the right 
to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.”101 
Participation by civil society in multiple decision 
processes of varying territorial compass perforce 
involves a huge number of private entities across all 
value processes.Several of these private entities are 
well organized through their respective systems of 
representation linking their affi liated organizations 
f rom loca l and nat ional th rough regional to 
international membership organizations. The range of 
participants should be as comprehensive as feasible, 
but it must be calibrated by the principle of economy 
to ensure the effectiveness of representation. The 
principle of effectiveness also requires participants’ 
capacity to enjoy participatory rights to bear their 
corresponding obligations because participation 
entails responsibility. 
To be responsible participants, they need to meet 
the requirements of transparency and accountability. 
They need to disclose to the public at large pertinent 
information about their organizations, purposes, 
activities and what their sources of funding are; 
and they need to be accountable for their act and 
conduct.102 
IV. Recent Trends of Non-State Actors as 
Authoritative Decision-Makers 
A. General Framework for Participation
Perhaps it is appropr iate now to examine 
the real effect of what is referred to as the clear 
“distinction” between participation without vote in 
the deliberations of ECOSOC for any UN member 
and representatives of the specialized agencies under 
Articles 69 and 70 of the UN Charter, on the one 
hand, and “consultation” with NGOs under Article 
71, on the other.103 Part II of Resolution 1996/31, 
Principles Governing the Nature of the Consultative 
Arrangements, further elaborates that distinction by 
stating that:  
Under Articles 69 and 70, participation is provided 
for only in the case of States not members 
of the Council, and of specialized agencies. 
Ar ticle 71, applying to non -governmental 
organizations, provides for suitable arrangements 
for consultation. This distinction, deliberately 
made in the Charter, is fundamental and the 
arrangements for consultation should not be such 
as to accord to non-governmental organizations 
the same rights of participation as are accorded 
to States not members of the Council and to the 
specialized agencies brought into relationship 
with the United Nations.104 
The distinction underlined by Resolution 1996/31 
is formalism in reiterating the states as subjects 
of international law. In contrast, even though the 
Guidelines for Participation of Major Groups and 
Stakeholders in Policy Design at UNEP acknowledge 
that the Rules of Procedures of the Governing 
Council provide for “international non-governmental 
organisations having an interest in the fi eld of the 
environment” to attend “as observers at public 
meetings of the Governing Council and its subsidiary 
organs, if any,”105 the Guidelines for Participation 
adopted a more creative approach for the engagement 
of non-state entities as follows:
Subject to approval of the President of the 
Governing Council, the accredited organisations 
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inter-relations of rules, we cannot afford to entertain 
the conventional theory about the states as the only 
subjects of international law; nor can we subscribe to 
the common conception of law-making in domestic 
political systems. Rather, it is more useful to adopt 
the New Haven School’s functional approach to 
describe the world’s different community decision 
processes in terms of the interpenetration of multiple 
processes of authoritative decision of varying 
territorial compass.
In these multiple processes of decision-making, 
people make a decision to maximise their preferred 
events through institutions affecting resources. The 
New Haven School has dissected what the term 
“decision” is made of in terms of its seven discrete, 
but interrelated decision functions as: (1) Intelligence: 
the gathering, processing, and disseminating of 
information relevant to the making of choices; 
(2) Promotion : the active advocacy of policy 
alternatives; (3) Prescription: the fashioning of one 
of competing policies as “law” and projecting it as 
the authoritative policy of the community in question; 
(4) Invocation : the provisional characterisation 
of events of deviation from prescriptions and 
the invocat ion of an author itat ive response; 
(5) Application: the applying of prescriptions to an 
alleged deviation, with sanction; (6) Termination: 
Putting an end to existing prescriptions and other 
arrangements that no longer refl ect appropriate 
public order goals; and (7) Appraisal: the on-going 
evaluation of the general performance of the decision 
process.
All these decision functions are distinct and 
discrete, and the performance of each decision 
function affects the performance of every other 
function. All these decision functions relate to 
authoritative response to claims about a set of 
problems developing in the global social process. 
For the purpose of this article, I will focus on how 
various non-state entities perform any one of these 
functions relating to claims for participation in the 
global constitutive process of decision. All non-state 
entities are performing any one of these decision 
functions to varying degrees.
The Intelligence Function: The intelligence 
function is the starting point for any action; it 
includes the gathering, processing, and disseminating 
are allowed, under the coordination of the MGFC 
[Major Groups Facilitation Committee]:
a) To participate in the Ministerial Round 
Tables of the GMEF [Global Ministerial 
Environmental Forum];
b) To have 9 seats in each of the plenary 
sessions of the meeting (opening, closing, 
GMEF, Committee of the Whole);
c) To have the opportunity to submit their 
written input to the President;
d) To participate in the open-ended subsidiary 
organs and bodies of the meeting.106 
It is a truism to say that there is a gap between 
what is formally stated in the offi cial pronouncement 
and how actual practice develops. In the process 
of the actual implementation of formal statements, 
somewhat different interpretations and applications 
will be made by those who are in the “trade,” so to 
speak. It is the “operational code.”107 According to 
Reisman, “what is distinctive about the operational 
code is that it is a private public law in systems 
in which public is supposed to be public; those 
authorized to play control functions and those who 
deal directly with them come to accept procedures 
that deviate from the myth system as licit.”108 
It is not helpful, therefore, to get entangled in 
the semantic and syntactic exercise of the difference 
between “par ticipation” and “consultation”109 
because “consultation” is only one of the forms of 
“participation,” and a wide range of participants 
perform a variety of decision functions in different 
decision arenas, organized and unorganized. The 
effectiveness of their participation hinges on how 
they can make use of access to a particular process 
of authority; what kind of resources they have at their 
disposal; what kind of instrument of policy they can 
employ in the course of performance of their various 
functions; and what kind of outcome they seek to 
achieve with what effect.
B. The Need for Functional Analysis
The moment we recognize that the reality 
of globalization has deconstructed a dichotomy 
of national and international law, in terms of the 
relative supremacy of one system of rules or other 
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of information essential to decision-making.110 The 
information and data assembled and evaluated clarify 
conditions that account for the current state of affairs 
and help direct the necessary action to improve the 
situation.  
As indicated in Agenda 21, non-state entities 
are actively participating in gathering information, 
and monitoring events in local communities.111 Most 
notably, NGOs such as the International Commission 
of Jurists, Amnesty International, and Human Rights 
Watch actively perform the intelligence function 
relating to the protection and development of human 
rights law.Amnesty International’s activities are 
fact-based and include sending experts to talk with 
victims; observing trials; interviewing local offi cials; 
liaising with human rights activists; monitoring 
global and local media; publishing detailed reports on 
human rights conditions; informing the news media; 
and publicizing our concerns in documents, leafl ets, 
posters, advertisements, newsletters and websites.112 
In other value process areas, the World Wildlife 
Fund, Oxfam International, the Bank Information 
Center, and so on113 undertake various intelligence 
tasks. All these NGOs are better positioned than 
territorial elites and their functionaries of the state 
to initiate any effort that may result in either limiting 
the state power or altering the direction of the extant 
policy.114 
Intelligence is the most critical and indispensable 
initial input to activate the decision process. The 
quality of intelligence shapes all the subsequent 
decision functions, but “the utility of the most 
accurate and timely intelligence depends upon a 
decisionmaker capable and willing to use it.”115 
The Promotion Function: On the basis of the 
intelligence gathered and processed, the decision 
phase turns to the promoting function which refers 
to the advocacy of policy alternatives, including the 
taking of initiatives which lead to the enactment 
of prescriptions. For non-state entities which 
are mostly denied access to organized arenas of 
decision because of “the entrance requirement,” the 
promotion function provides them with opportunity 
to play a critical role in stimulating demands for 
the enactment of new prescriptions. Several NGOs 
are initiating, participating in the decision process 
or co-opting, incorporating or circumventing the 
various phases of the global decision process, as 
analysed by Judge Oda in his dissenting opinion 
on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons cases.116 “The 
idea behind the resolution whereby the General 
Assembly (and also the WHO) requested advisory 
opinions, had previously been advanced by a handful 
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which 
initiated a campaign for the total prohibition of 
nuclear weapons....”117 The contributions by various 
NGOs to the conclusion of multilateral conventions 
cannot be overstated.118 Notable recent examples 
include the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child,119 the Rome Statute for the International 
Criminal Court,120 and the International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines which led to the Mine Ban Treaty121  
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f unc t ion  a s  t he  development  of  customa r y 
international law.126 
The Invoking Function: The invoking function 
is for claimants who character ize, from their 
perspective, on-going events in terms of extant 
prescriptions by asserting a certain set of facts about 
what has happened, what policies or prescriptions 
have been violated, and what remedies might be 
available to cure the deteriorating conditions. 
International NGOs which have networks with 
national NGOs which are most knowledgeable in 
the local conditions of various countries initiate the 
invoking function. “The quality of the process of 
authoritative decision depends in no small measure 
upon the ability of individuals and non-state actors 
to challenge unlawful deprivations.”127 
Many NGOs are accorded a locus standi not only 
in international human rights organizations such 
as the European Court of Human Rights and the 
American Commission on Human Rights, but also 
in the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement 
panel and various accountability mechanisms of IFIs 
such as the World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank. NGOs are in a position to lodge claims on 
behalf of victims before these international decision 
arenas.128 
The Application Function: Non-state entities 
face the perennial barr ier, i.e., “the entrance 
requirement,” mentioned at the outset, to the 
organized arenas of decision as the applying 
function is the fi nal characterization of the events 
alleged by claimants in terms of extant prescriptions 
and the management of sanctioning measures to 
secure enforcement. It is considered the prerogative 
of the state elites. They undertake the various 
forms of application such as “investigation,” 
“fact-fi nding,” “reporting,” “negotiation,” “good 
offi ces,” “mediation,” “commissions of enquiry,” 
“conciliation,” “arbitration,” and “adjudication.”129 
Non-state actors’ participation in the application 
funct ion, that had sta r ted with the tasks of 
monitoring compliance with treaty-obligations of 
and the Cluster Munition Coalition’s work for the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions.122 Without their 
advocacy campaign and lobbying around the world, 
it would not have been possible to have these treaties 
concluded. As Stephan Hobe states, “NGOs do not 
only participate in state-initiated conferences but 
have also taken up the role of initiatives of state 
conferences.”123 
The Prescribing Function: The prescribing 
function is communicating people’s expectations 
about pol icy, author ity, and cont rol th rough 
reciprocal claims and mutual tolerance in their 
interact ions.124 Sequentia l ly, the prescr ipt ive 
function has four distinct phases: the initiation of 
the process, the evaluation of relevant facts and 
potential policies; the formulation of the policy to 
be projected as authoritative for the community; and 
the communication of the prescriptive content and 
expectations about authority and control to the target 
audience. As mentioned in the promotion function 
above, NGOs play a considerable role in the fi rst two 
phases.
To appreciate the realistic scope and range of 
the prescribing function that can be performed by 
non-state actors, the narrow range of the “sources” 
of international law as specifi ed in Article 38 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice is 
far from satisfactory.125 The stark reality is that no 
decisions of any of the international organizations 
operating worldwide today, including the United 
Nations, have been mentioned in Article 38. Since 
most decision arenas in which NGOs participate 
are parliamentary or quasi-parliamentary settings 
like international conferences, the exclusion of 
decisions of international organizations would ipso 
facto preclude a large portion of NGOs’ contribution 
to the prescribing function. Nevertheless, however 
tenuous its relevance may be, subparagraph (b) of 
Article 38, “international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law,” may be invoked 
to recognize a contribution of non-state entities in 
general and NGOs in particular to the prescribing 
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human rights instruments, has vastly broadened as to 
include access to judicial bodies, and conversely the 
ICJ has increasingly become the target of popular 
appeal that it allow “more and diverse voices to be 
heard in addition to those of the States parties to the 
proceedings, especially those belonging to groups 
traditionally silenced by the primacy accorded to 
States’ interests.”130 
Traditionally, the technique to overcome the 
“entrance requirement” was for the state of private 
corporations to espouse its nationals’ claims before 
international tribunals. Today, the proliferation of 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and free trade 
agreements (FTAs) that have empowered investors 
to bring their own claims against host states has 
rendered the démarche of diplomatic protection 
unnecessary for the settlement of investor-state 
disputes.131 The investors’ right to bring claims 
against the host state has generated the case law 
through the investor-state arbitrations, and private 
attorneys are now making “global administrative 
law” in the course of such arbitrations.132 
Increasingly NGOs are participating in the 
applying function process by way of fi ling amicus 
curiae briefs in international tr ibunals.133 The 
adamant refusal by the ICJ of NGOs’ amicus briefs 
notwithstanding, NGOs have won partial success 
in the Appellate Body of the WTO.134 As indicated 
by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission135 and 
demonstrated by the Methanex Tribunal,136 a growing 
trend is to accept NGOs’ amicus briefs.      
The Terminating Function: The termination 
function sometimes takes place concurrently as the 
prescribing function is being performed. The former 
terminates an extant prescription that has become 
short of meeting demanded public order goals and 
the termination of a prescription itself often leads to 
a new prescription. Non-state actors being unoffi cial, 
private groups cannot be formal “terminators,” but 
as in the prescribing function they would be active 
promoters of new prescriptions. They represent 
“affected parties” which are mostly private citizens.
A s  i n  t h e  p r o h i b i t i o n  o f  c h i l d  l a b o r ,  
anti-personnel land-mines, and cluster munitions, 
the termination function is designed to keep 
prescriptions in line with the goals of world public 
order. NGOs campaign for withdrawing certain 
incidental benefi ts of recognition from the target 
government or terminat ing obsolete pol icies 
for international fi nancial institutions’ fi nancial 
assistance.
The Appraising Function: 
Various non-state entities of varying degrees of 
effectiveness perform the intelligence, promotion, 
law-making or prescr ipt ion, invocat ion, and 
application functions of decision-making and 
help enormously the performance of the on-going 
appraisal function. The core task of appraisal 
is to identify who is responsible for success or 
failure in terms of the policy objectives of the 
larger community. Non-state actors contribute to 
ECOSOC’s reporting task on the performance of its 
responsibilities.137 
V. For the Future
Antonio Gramsci’s writings suggest “a sturdy 
structure of civil society” is in the core of the state, 
which is “only an outer ditch” and civil society is 
behind it as “a powerful system of fortresses and 
earthworks.”138 I draw upon Gramsci’s ideas about 
“a complex and well-articulated civil society” to be 
constructed “within the hush of political society” 
by the initiatives of the private individuals.139 It is 
the critical contributing force of private groups and 
associations that build and re-confi rm the hegemony 
of the governed, i.e., the sovereignty of individuals.
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NGOs in the decision arenas of international 
organizations. They are clearly as legit imate 
participants in the global process of decision as 
states represented by their territorial elites. They are 
all making claims and being subject to claims in the 
most comprehensive process of decision. Individuals 
and private groups are making choices about events 
that will have some effect on the international plane. 
Individuals who comprise non-state actors will 
continue demanding their participation in the global 
process of decision from local efforts through local 
institutions in the internal political processes of 
bodies politic.
W hat  is  needed is  to  connect  t hese two 
separate processes of decision in terms of discrete 
transnational functional decision processes as 
part of global governance. By “discrete functional 
transnational decision processes,” I refer to a national 
process of decision that transcends national scope 
to impact on the international process of decision. 
For example, local or national chapters of non-state 
actors will generate their respective claims through 
national mechanisms which will eventually culminate 
in their national decision outcomes. These national 
decision outcomes will in turn become part of input 
to the international decision process. Two separate 
processes of decision will thus be interlocked.  These 
processes are functional since there is no centralized 
overall “political infrastructure” to support oversight 
of such two discrete processes. 
To integrate the artifi cially segregated processes, 
we will need the stronger political leadership of 
territorial elites of states who are supported by the 
infl uence and power of the legislature and its relevant 
political parties in the state concerned.  Without the 
development of open political processes within the 
state, “participation” in the international process 
would become a mere rhetorical exercise. 
From the perspectives of the territorial elites 
non-state actors are interlocutors from outside. It is 
the territorial elites that regulate non-state actors’ 
access to the organized arenas of international 
organizations by deciding which non-state actors to 
consult with. Under these circumstances, non-state 
actors must not only co -opt, and ride with, the 
power of the government and the legislature of 
the country,142 but also stimulate demands and 
expectations about authority for non-state actors 
A. Bridging the Gap between Vertical Internal 
Processes of Decision with the Horizontal 
International Process of Decision  
In domestic political arenas the question of 
law-making is initiated and addressed systematically 
in institutionalized and organized settings such as 
public hearing fora and public opinions surveys, 
periodical elections, parliamentary deliberations, 
gover n ment s’  r ev iew boa rds ,  a nd  jud ic ia l  
proceedings. In international political arenas, 
however, no formal process or mechanism exists in 
which private individuals or groups have access to any 
organized arena of decision. The commonly-held 
concept ion of  law- ma k ing per petuates th is  
disconnection between the vertical order of the 
state’s domestic arenas and the horizontal order 
of international arenas. The separation of the 
international process of the world community and the 
internal process of the state is thus used as a pretext 
to rationalize the “entrance requirements”, and 
vice versa. The combined effect is to buttress and 
safeguard the power base of territorial elites. Even 
in modern democracies ordinary private citizens’ 
participation in decision-making processes on 
foreign affairs is rarely open unless public hearings 
are held. It remains entirely within the domain of 
public offi cials.140 
The range of operations undertaken and decision 
functions performed by various non-state actors, 
however, abundantly demonstrates that non-state 
actors are now transcending the neat traditional 
separation of the two processes. “Hegemony” in 
Gramsci’s sense must be continuously reconstructed 
in the context of ongoing social change by educating 
private individuals and groups for support to a newly 
emerging social order.
Non-state actors are bridging the gap between 
the internal vertical processes of bodies politic and 
the international horizontal process of the world 
community. As Pascal Lamy, Director-General of the 
WTO, says, “the degree of legitimacy decreases with 
distance from domestic political processes.”141 For an 
international decision to be legitimate, the general 
support of a majority of citizens in their domestic 
political processes is indispensable as it is the source 
of authority. Individual members of local NGOs are 
connected through national NGOs with international 
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as effective participants in the global constitutive 
process of decision.143 Civil society is, after all, part of 
political society and non-state actors made of private 
individuals should become “its normal continuation, 
its organic complement,” rather than entering into 
confl ict with it.144 Non-state actors, as participants in 
that global process of decision, must capitalize on the 
will and capability of local and national institutions 
such as local courts, local police, civil service, local 
media and civil society  in order to transnationalize 
the internal decision process of their country and 
integrate it with the global process of decision.145♣ 
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